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REPUTATION IN LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIPS
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Abstract. We model a long-run relationship as an inﬁnitely repeated game played by two equally
patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form stage-game of perfect information
with either locally nonconﬂicting interests or strictly conﬂicting interests. There is incomplete
information about the type of player 1, while player 2’s type is commonly known. We show that a
suﬃciently patient player 1 can leverage player 2’s uncertainty about his type to secure his highest
payoﬀ, compatible with player 2’s individual rationality, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
repeated game.
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1. Introduction
Maintaining a reputation can beneﬁt economic agents since it lends credibility to their future
commitments, threats or promises. A reputation can help a ﬁrm commit to ﬁght potential entrants
(Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982)) or it can lend credibility to a government’s
monetary and ﬁscal policies (Barro (1986), Phelan (2006)). So a patient agent may forego short-run
proﬁt in order to cultivate a reputation in anticipation of long-run beneﬁts.
Reputation eﬀects are pronounced if an agent is patient, that is, if the short-run cost of building
a reputation is less important to the agent than the long-run beneﬁt (Fudenberg and Levine (1989,
1992)). There is a tension, however, if the agent trying to build a reputation faces an opponent who
is equally patient: the opponent may also sacriﬁce payoﬀ in the short-run in order to extensively
test the agent’s resolve to go through with his commitments, threats, or promises. This can make it
prohibitively expensive to build a reputation in a certain class of repeated games where players move
simultaneously (Cripps and Thomas (1997)). To highlight this tension, we focus in this paper on
equally patient agents and show that in repeated games where players move sequentially reputation
eﬀects are nevertheless prominent.
We consider an inﬁnitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. We assume that
player 2 is uncertain about the type of player 1, while player 1 is perfectly informed about the
type of player 2. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information.
There are either locally nonconﬂicting interests (LNCI) or strictly conﬂicting interests (SCI) in
the stage game.
1 Within this framework we prove a reputation result: a suﬃciently patient player
1 can guarantee his highest payoﬀ compatible with player 2’s individual rationality, in any perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.
To make the discussion more concrete, consider the following strategic situation faced by a hus-
band and wife, two legislators, or two countries: In each period of a long-run relationship, the two
players must decide whether to undertake player 1’s preferred policy A, player 2’s preferred policy
B, or neither of the two policies. Unanimity is required for any policy to be chosen. These policies
can represent competing treaties in a pollution abatement negotiation between two countries, bud-
get alternatives under consideration by two political rivals, or even weekend plans being bargained
1There are LNCI in a game if the unique payoﬀ proﬁle where player 1 receives his highest payoﬀ is strictly individually
rational for player 2. Intuitively, there are SCI in a game if the action which is the best for player 1 is the worst for
his opponent. See Assumption 1 for precise statements.REPUTATION 2
over by a married couple. The repeated game where ﬁgure 1 is played in each period is a simple













Note: The ﬁrst component of the payoﬀ vector is player 1’s payoﬀ.
Figure 1. The battle-of-the-sexes game.
Suppose that player 2 (she) believes that player 1 (he) is either fully rational or a Stackelberg
type who is committed to choosing A in each period. A rational player 1, cognizant of player 2’s
uncertainty, has an incentive to mimic the Stackelberg type, i.e., to build a reputation. If player
2 is convinced that player 1 is the Stackelberg type, then she will have no choice but to play A,
and policy A will be the outcome in each period. Therefore, a patient player 1 may play A for
many periods, even if player 2 plays B (i.e., at the expense of reaching an agreement), in order to
convince player 2 that he is indeed the Stackelberg type. However, player 2 knows that player 1
has an incentive to mimic the Stackelberg type. Consequently, an equally patient player 2 may play
B (i.e., resist playing A) for many periods, thereby making reputation building particularly costly,
especially if she deems it suﬃcient likely that player 1 is rational and will eventually start playing
B.
Given these two opposing forces, can player 1 build a reputation and ensure that policy A is
implemented? Or alternatively, will screening by player 2 keep a rational player 1 from building
a reputation? These questions are addressed in our main ﬁnding: if the players are equally and
arbitrarily patient, then policy A is implemented in each period and player 1 receives a payoﬀ equal
to two in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game. This outcome is independent of
which player moves ﬁrst and independent of how small the initial uncertainty about player 1’s type
is.3
2The battle-of-the-sexes game is used to model product compatibility in Farrell and Saloner (1988), network externali-
ties in Katz and Shapiro (1985), communication and mediation in Banks and Calvert (1992), and repeated bargaining
in Schelling (1960). For the battle-of-the-sexes game applied to pollution abatement negotiations between nations,
see Harstad (2007); for an application to negotiations between political rivals, see Alesina and Drazen (1991); and for
an application to marital bargaining, see Lundberg and Pollak (1994).
3See ﬁgure 2d for the battle-of-the-sexes game where player 1 moves ﬁrst.REPUTATION 3
In the previous example, player 1’s reputation allowed him to credibly commit to always choosing
the same action. However, we can conceive of other strategic situations where player 1 may want to
commit to a more complex strategy that rewards or punishes his opponent in a history-dependent
way. For example, player 1 may want to be known for playing tit-for-tat, or for punishing bad
behavior consistently. To capture reputation eﬀects more generally, we assume that player 1 is
either fully rational or one of many commitment types. Each commitment type is programmed to
play a certain repeated game strategy. The commitment type central to our analysis is a dynamic
Stackelberg type. This type plays the repeated game strategy that player 1 would choose if player
1 could publicly commit to any repeated game strategy. Ideally, player 1 would like to convince
his opponent that his future actions will fully conform to the behavior of the Stackelberg type. We
show that a suﬃciently patient player 1 can use his ability to mimic the Stackelberg type and his
opponent’s uncertainty about his type to secure his most preferred outcome for the repeated game.
1.1. Related literature. This paper is closely related to the literature on reputation eﬀects in
repeated games. Much of the previous literature on reputation considers a patient player 1 who
faces a myopic opponent. Most prominently, Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) show that if there
is positive probability that player 1 is a type committed to playing the Stackelberg action in every
period, then player 1 gets at least his static Stackelberg payoﬀ in any equilibrium of the repeated
game.4 Reputation results have also been established for repeated games where player 1 faces
a nonmyopic opponent, but one who is suﬃciently less patient than player 1 (see Schmidt (1993),
Celentani et al. (1996), Aoyagi (1996), or Evans and Thomas (1997)). However, the repeated games
that these papers consider are genuinely long-run only for player 1 and this feature is crucial for
the reputation results.
In a game with a nonmyopic opponent, player 1 may achieve a payoﬀ that exceeds his static
Stackelberg payoﬀ by using a history-dependent strategy that rewards or punishes player 2. Con-
versely, future punishments or rewards can induce player 2 to not best respond to a Stackelberg
action and thereby force player 1 below his static Stackelberg payoﬀ.5 These complications render
reputation eﬀects fragile in repeated games with equally patient players: A reputation result obtains
4The static Stackelberg payoﬀ for player 1 is the highest payoﬀ he can guarantee in the stage game through public
commitment to a stage game action (a Stackelberg action). See Mailath and Samuelson (2006, page 465), for a formal
deﬁnition.
5Player 2 may expect punishments or rewards either from the rational type of player 1 after he chooses a move that
would not be chosen by the Stackelberg type (Celentani et al. (1996, Section 5) or Cripps and Thomas (1997)), or
from a commitment type other than the Stackelberg type (Schmidt (1993) or Celentani et al. (1996)).REPUTATION 4
in a repeated simultaneous-move game only if the stage game is a strictly dominant action game
(Chan (2000)), or if there are SCI in the stage game (Cripps et al. (2005)).6 For other repeated
simultaneous-move games, any individually rational payoﬀ can be sustained in a perfect equilibrium
if the players are suﬃciently patient (see the folk theorem of Cripps and Thomas (1997)).7
1.2. Contribution to the literature. We make three main contributions to the literature on
reputation eﬀects in repeated games with equally patient players. First, we provide a reputation
result for a new class of games: repeated extensive-form games of perfect information. Second, we
highlight the distinct role that perfect information plays for a reputation result with equally patient
agents. Third, we introduce novel methods, inspired by the bargaining literature (Myerson, 1991,
Chapter 8.8), to analyze reputation eﬀects in repeated games.
Previous reputation results for equally patient agents are for certain repeated simultaneous-move
games (i.e., Chan (2000) for strictly dominant action stage-games and Cripps et al. (2005) for stage-
games with SCI). In contrast, we focus on repeated extensive-form games of perfect information,
and as our ﬁrst main contribution, we establish a reputation result for stage-games with LNCI or
SCI.8 Games that are commonly used in economic applications, such as the examples depicted in
ﬁgures 1 and 2, are included in the class of games that we cover in our reputation result.9,10
Games with LNCI have a common-value component whereas games with SCI entail conﬂict
between the two players. A game has LNCI if the unique payoﬀ proﬁle where player 1 receives his
highest stage-game payoﬀ is strictly individually rational for player 2. The battle-of-the-sexes game
where player 2 moves ﬁrst (ﬁgure 1), the common interest game (ﬁgure 2a), and the principal-agent
game (ﬁgure 2b) have LNCI. These games have LNCI because player 1 receives his highest payoﬀ in
the payoﬀ proﬁle (2,1), (1,1), and (1,1), in ﬁgures 1, 2a, and 2b, respectively. Moreover, in each of
6A stage-game is a strictly dominant action game if player 1’s static Stackelberg payoﬀ is equal to his highest
payoﬀ compatible with player 2’s individual rationality, and if the Stackelberg action is strictly dominant, see
Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Page 540) for a formal deﬁnition.
7Also, see Cripps and Thomas (1995) for a model of equally patient agents which uses the limit of means criteria
instead of equal discounting.
8If a game in the class that we consider (i.e., a game with LNCI or SCI) is played under complete information, then
the folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) applies under a full dimensionality condition (see Wen (2002)).
9Examples of common interest games include the coordination game and the hawk-dove game (for applications, see
Morris and Shin (1998) and Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2004)). For an application of the repeated principal-agent game,
see Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 9). For an application of the chain-store game in industrial organization,
see Tirole (1988, Chapter 9).
10A game falls outside of the class of games with LNCI or SCI if the proﬁle where player 1 receives his highest payoﬀ
is not strictly individually rational for player 2, and the game does not have SCI. Examples of such games include
the prisoner’s dilemma game and the principal-agent game in ﬁgure 2b if player 2 is the player that is building a















































(d) The battle-of-the-sexes game.
Figure 2. Sequential-move games with LNCI (2a and 2b) or SCI (2c and 2d).
these proﬁles, player 2’s payoﬀ strictly exceeds her minimax, which is equal to zero, 1/4, and zero,
in ﬁgures 1, 2a, and 2b, respectively.
A game has SCI if player 1 has an action (a Stackelberg action) such that any best reply to this
action yields player 1 his highest payoﬀ compatible with player 2’s individual rationality and yields
player 2 her minimax payoﬀ. The chain-store game (ﬁgure 2c) and the battle-of-the-sexes game
where player 2 moves second (ﬁgure 2d) have SCI. The chain-store game has SCI because, if player
1 commits to action F and player 2 best responds to F, then player 1 receives a payoﬀ equal to
four, his highest payoﬀ; and player 2 receives a payoﬀ equal to zero, her minimax payoﬀ. Similarly
in the battle-of-the-sexes game where player 2 moves second, if player 1 plays action A and player 2
best responds, then player 1 receives a payoﬀ equal to two, his highest payoﬀ; and player 2 receives
a payoﬀ equal to one, her minimax payoﬀ.
Our second main contribution pinpoints why reputation eﬀects are particularly salient in repeated
games with LNCI and perfect information, whereas reputation eﬀects are absent in certain repeated
simultaneous-move games with LNCI. For example, our reputation result implies that there is a
unique equilibrium payoﬀ proﬁle in the repeated sequential-move battle-of-the-sexes game (ﬁgure
1 or ﬁgure 2d). In contrast, if a simultaneous move game with LNCI, such as the battle-of-the-
sexes game (ﬁgure 3b), is played in each period, then a folk theorem obtains. For a more striking
example, consider the repeated simultaneous-move common interest game (ﬁgure 3a), where player
1 is potentially a Stackelberg type who always plays U. This game appears to be a strong candidateREPUTATION 6
for reputation eﬀects to arise. It is costless for player 1 to mimic the Stackelberg type and build
a reputation. Also, player 2 unambiguously beneﬁts if player 1 is able to build a reputation and
concentrate play on (U,L). Surprisingly, any individually rational payoﬀ proﬁle can be sustained
in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the players are arbitrarily patient (Cripps and Thomas (1997)).
In contrast, we show that in the repeated sequential-move game, the players receive a payoﬀ equal
























(b) The battle-of-the-sexes game.
Figure 3. Simultaneous-move games with LNCI.
Our third main contribution is the novel method that we use to establish our reputation result.
A new approach is required because the technique of Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992), which is
commonly used to establish reputation results, is not applicable with two equally patient players.
Our method hinges on having those information sets where player 1’s normal type reveals ratio-
nality be singletons (perfect information). Sequential rationality, coupled with perfect information,
imposes tight bounds on player 1’s continuation payoﬀs at these nodes. Moreover, for the class of
games that we consider, if there is a tight bound on player 1’s continuation payoﬀ, then there is also
a tight bound on player 2’s continuation payoﬀs. These bounds preclude the possibility of player 1
building a reputation slowly and punishing player 2 for best responding to the Stackelberg strategy.
2. The model
In the inﬁnitely repeated game, a stage game Γ is played by players 1 and 2 in periods t ∈
{0,1,2,...} and the players discount their payoﬀs using a common discount factor δ ∈ [0,1). The
stage game Γ is a two-player ﬁnite game of perfect information, that is, all the information sets of
Γ are singletons (perfect information).
The set of nodes (decision nodes and terminal nodes) of the stage game Γ is denoted by D, d is
a typical element of D, Y ⊂ D is the set of terminal nodes, and y is a typical element of Y . The
payoﬀ function of player i is gi : Y → R. The ﬁnite set of pure stage game actions for player i is
11For a more detailed discussion, see section 4.1.REPUTATION 7
Ai, and the set of mixed stage game actions is Ai.12 For any action proﬁle a = (a1,a2) ∈ A1 × A2,
there is a unique terminal history y(a) ∈ Y under the path of play induced by a. Slightly abusing
notation we let gi(a) = gi(y(a)) for any a ∈ A1 × A2, and we let gi(α) denote the payoﬀ to mixed
action proﬁle α ∈ A1 × A2.
The minimax payoﬀ for player i is ˆ gi = minαj∈Aj maxαi∈Ai gi(αi,αj). For games that satisfy
perfect information, there exists a
p
1 ∈ A1 such that g2(a
p
1,a2) ≤ ˆ g2 for all a2 ∈ A2.13 The set of
feasible payoﬀs F is the convex hull of the set {g1(a1,a2),g2(a1,a2) : (a1,a2) ∈ A1 × A2}; and
the set of feasible and individually rational payoﬀs is G = F ∩ {(g1,g2) : g1 ≥ ˆ g1,g2 ≥ ˆ g2}. Let
¯ g1 = max{g1 : (g1,g2) ∈ G} and let M = max{max{|g1|,|g2|} : (g1,g2) ∈ F}.14
In the repeated game, players have perfect recall and can observe past outcomes. The set of
period t ≥ 0 public histories is denoted Y t × D and h = (y0,y1,...,yt−1,d) is a typical element.
The set of period t ≥ 0 public histories of terminal nodes is denoted Ht ≡ Y t, a typical element
is ht = (y0,y1,...,yt−1), and we deﬁne h0 = ∅. At the end of a period t, player i observes neither
player j’s stage-game mixed action αt
j in period t, nor player j’s pure action at
j. Rather, player i
observes the terminal node yt and consequently the unique sequence of moves at the decision nodes
that led to the particular terminal node yt.15
2.1. Types and Strategies. Before time zero, nature selects player 1’s type ω from a countable
set of types Ω according to a common-knowledge prior  . Player 2 is known with certainty to be
a normal type that maximizes expected discounted utility. The set of types Ω contains a normal
type for player 1 that we denote by N. Slightly abusing notation, we denote player 2’s belief over
player 1’s types after any period t public history by   :
S∞
t=0 Y t × D → ∆(Ω).
A behavior strategy for player i is a function σi :
S∞
t=0 Ht → Ai, and Σi is the set of all behavior
strategies. A behavior strategy chooses a mixed stage game action given any period t public history
of terminal nodes.16 Each type ω ∈ Ω \ {N} is committed to playing a particular repeated game
behavior strategy σ1(ω). A strategy proﬁle σ = ({σ1(ω)}ω∈Ω,σ2) lists the behavior strategies of all
12An action ai ∈ Ai is a contingent plan that speciﬁes a move, from the set of feasible moves for player i, at any
decision node d where player i is called upon to move.
13Consider the zero-sum game where player 1’s payoﬀ is equal to −g2(a1,a2). The minimax of this game is (−ˆ g2, ˆ g2)
by deﬁnition. Perfect information and Zermelo’s lemma imply that this game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(a
p
1,a2) ∈ A1 ×A2. Because the game is a zero sum game and the minimax value of the game is equal to (−ˆ g2, ˆ g2) we
have that g2(a
p
1,a2) = ˆ g2.
14Note that with a slight abuse of notation gi denotes both the payoﬀ function as well as the payoﬀ level for player i.
15See Fudenberg and Levine (1992, Page 564) for more on this particular type of imperfect monitoring inherent in
extensive-form games.
16Abusing notation, we will use σi to also denote mixed repeated game strategies for player i.REPUTATION 8
the types of player 1 and player 2. For any period t public history ht and σi ∈ Σi, the continuation
strategy induced by ht is σi|ht. For σ1 ∈ Σ1 and σ2 ∈ Σ2, the probability measure over the set of
(inﬁnite) public histories induced by (σ1,σ2) is Pr(σ1,σ2).
In what follows we assume that Ω contains a certain Stackelberg type S. We elaborate on the
Stackelberg type in section 2.5. Also, we denote the set of other commitment types by Ω− =
Ω\{S,N}. In words, Ω− is the set of types other than the Stackelberg type and the normal type.
2.2. The repeated game and payoﬀs. A player’s repeated game payoﬀ is the normalized dis-
counted sum of the stage game payoﬀs. For any inﬁnite public history h∞ = (y0,y1,...), let
ui(h∞,δ) = (1 − δ)
P∞
k=0 δkgi(yk); and let ui(h−t,δ) = (1 − δ)
P∞
k=t δk−tgi(yk) where h−t = (yt,yt+1,...).
Following a period t public history, player 1 and player 2’s expected continuation payoﬀ, under strat-







where Ui(σ1(ω),σ2,δ|ht) = E(σ1(ω),σ2)[ui(h−t,δ)|ht] is the expectation over continuation histories
h−t with respect to Pr(σ1(ω)|ht,σ2|ht). Also, Ui(σ,δ) = Ui(σ,δ|h0).
The repeated game of complete information (that is, the repeated game without any commitment
types) with discount factor equal to δ ∈ [0,1), is denoted by Γ∞(δ). The repeated game of incomplete
information, with the prior over the set of commitment types given by   ∈ ∆(Ω) and the discount
factor equal to δ ∈ [0,1), is denoted by Γ∞( ,δ).
2.3. Dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ and strategy. We deﬁne the commitment payoﬀ of player





where the set BR(σ1,δ) denotes player 2’s best responses to σ1 in the repeated game Γ∞(δ). Also,
we deﬁne the dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ as Us
1(δ) = supσ1∈Σ1 Uc
1(σ1,δ); and we deﬁne a dynamic
Stackelberg strategy as any strategy, σ∗
1, that satisﬁes Uc
1(σ∗
1,δ) = Us
1(δ), if such a strategy exists.17
17This terminology follows Aoyagi (1996) and Evans and Thomas (1997).REPUTATION 9
Player 1’s dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ is the highest payoﬀ that player 1 can secure in the repeated
game through public commitment to a repeated game strategy. A dynamic Stackelberg strategy for
player 1 is a repeated game strategy such that any best response to this strategy gives player 1 at
least his dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ. In other words, a dynamic Stackelberg strategy’s commitment
payoﬀ is equal to the dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ.
2.4. Class of stage games. We assume that the stage game satisﬁes Assumption 1 as stated
below:
Assumption 1. The stage game Γ satisﬁes either of the following:
(i) Locally Nonconﬂicting Interests (LNCI): For any g ∈ G and g′ ∈ G, if g1 = g′
1 = ¯ g1, then
g2 = g′
2 > ˆ g2; or
(ii) Strictly Conﬂicting Interests (SCI): There exists a1 ∈ A1 such that any best response to a1
yields payoﬀs (¯ g1, ˆ g2). Also, g2 = ˆ g2 for all (¯ g1,g2) ∈ G.18
Both Assumption 1 item (i) and (ii) require that there is a unique payoﬀ proﬁle where player
1’s payoﬀ is equal to ¯ g1 (for example, this is true if the game Γ is a generic extensive form game).
However, the set of games with LNCI and the set of games with SCI are mutually exclusive. Games
with LNCI, have a common value component: in the payoﬀ proﬁle where player 1 receives his highest
payoﬀ player 2 receives a payoﬀ that strictly exceeds her minimax value. To see that games with
LNCI have a common value component, notice that in ﬁgure 4a the boundary of the set of feasible
payoﬀs is increasing in a neighborhood of the point (¯ g1,g2). Some examples of games with LNCI
are the battle-of-the-sexes game where player 1 moves second (ﬁgure 1), the common interest game
(ﬁgure 2a) and the principal-agent game (ﬁgure 2b). In contrast, a game has SCI if player 1 has an
action (a Stackelberg action) such that any best response to this action yields player 1 his highest
payoﬀ compatible with player 2’s individual rationality and yields player 2 her minimax payoﬀ.19
Some examples of games with SCI are the chain-store game (ﬁgure 2c) and the battle-of-the-sexes
game where player 1 moves ﬁrst (ﬁgure 2d). An example of the set of feasible payoﬀs for a game
with SCI is shown in ﬁgure 4b. Some games that do not satisfy Assumption 1 are discussed in
section 4.2.
There are two main implications of Assumption 1 that are central for the analysis that follows:
18See Cripps et al. (2005), or Mailath and Samuelson (2006, page 541).
19See the product choice game (ﬁgure 10b in section 4.2) for an example where a Stackelberg action does not exist.REPUTATION 10
b
b (¯ g1,g2)




(a) LNCI: the set F is bounded above
and below by the lines that go through
(¯ g1,g2).





(b) SCI: the set F is bounded above by
the downward sloping line that connects
(¯ g1, ˆ g2) to (ˆ g1, ¯ g2).
Figure 4. Typical set of feasible payoﬀs for a game with LNCI (4a) or SCI (4b).
First, if Γ satisﬁes Assumption 1, then player 1’s dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ is equal to player
1’s high payoﬀ that is compatible with the individual rationality of player 2 (i.e., ¯ g1) and there
exists a particular strategy, σ1(S), such that the commitment payoﬀ to σ1(S) is equal to ¯ g1, in the
repeated game Γ∞(δ), for all δ that exceed a cutoﬀ δ∗ ∈ [0,1). We establish this in section 2.5
below by constructing σ1(S) for games that satisfy Assumption 1.20
Second, if Γ satisﬁes Assumption 1, then there are linear bounds on the feasible payoﬀs for player
2 that pass through the point (¯ g1,g2); and hence, player 2’s payoﬀ are in a narrow range if player
1’s payoﬀ is close to ¯ g1 (see ﬁgure 4; or for a precise statement see inequalities (2) and (3) in section
3.2.1). This is because Assumption 1 requires that there is a unique payoﬀ proﬁle where player 1’s
payoﬀ is equal to ¯ g1.21
These two main implications of Assumption 1 together establish the following (when the discount
factor exceeds a cutoﬀ δ∗ ∈ [0,1)): if player 1’s repeated game payoﬀ is close to the commitment
payoﬀ of σ1(S) (which is equal to player 1’s highest payoﬀ compatible with player 2’s individual
rationality, i.e., ¯ g1), then player 2’s feasible and individually rational repeated game payoﬀs are in
a narrow range determined by the linear bounds introduced in the previous paragraph.
20For an example in which our construction of σ1(S) does not work because Assumption 1 is violated, see the product
choice game depicted in ﬁgure 10b, section 4.2.
21For an example that does not satisfy this requirement of Assumption 1, see the non-generic common-interest game
depicted in ﬁgure 10a, section 4.2.REPUTATION 11
2.5. The Stackelberg type. For an arbitrary stage game Γ that satisﬁes Assumption 1, we now
construct the strategy σ1(S) such that Uc
1(σ1(S),δ) = ¯ g1 for all δ that exceed a cutoﬀ δ∗.22 We
term the commitment type S who plays strategy σ1(S) the Stackelberg type.
First, some preliminary deﬁnitions: If there is an action for player 1, a1 ∈ A1, and a best
response for player 2 to action a1, a2 ∈ A2, such that g1(a1,a2) = ¯ g1, then deﬁne as
1 = a1 and ab
2 =
a2.23 Otherwise, deﬁne (as
1,ab
2) ∈ A1 × A2 as a particular action proﬁle such that g1(as
1,ab
2) = ¯ g1.
Assumption 1 implies that there exists an action proﬁle (as
1,ab
2) ∈ A1×A2 such that g1(as
1,ab
2) = ¯ g1.24
Description of σ1(S). The strategy σ1(S) has a proﬁt phase and a punishment phase. In the
proﬁt phase the strategy plays as
1, and in the punishment phase the strategy plays a
p
1. The strategy
begins the game in the proﬁt phase. The strategy remains in the proﬁt phase in period t, if it was
in the proﬁt phase in period t−1 and if g1(yt−1) = ¯ g1. The strategy moves to the punishment phase
in period t, if it was in the proﬁt phase in period t−1 and if g1(yt−1)  = ¯ g1. If the strategy moves to
the punishment phase in period t, then it remains in the punishment phase for np − 1 periods and
then moves to the proﬁt phase. Intuitively, σ1(S) punishes player 2 by minimaxing her for the next
np − 1 periods if she does not allow player 1 to obtain a payoﬀ of ¯ g1. The number of punishment
periods np − 1 is the smallest integer such that
(1) g2(as
1,a2) + (np − 1)ˆ g2 < npg2(as
1,ab
2)
for any a2 ∈ A2 such that g1(as
1,a2) < g1(as
1,ab
2) = ¯ g1.
Assumption 1 implies that np ≥ 1 exists. The number of punishment periods is chosen to ensure
that it is a best response for a suﬃciently patient player 2 to play ab
2 in every period against σ1(S).
More precisely, if σ2 ∈ BR(σ1(S),δ), then U1(σ1(S),σ2,δ) = ¯ g1, for all δ that exceed a cutoﬀ δ∗.
Consequently, σ1(S) is a dynamic Stackelberg strategy for all δ that exceed a cutoﬀ δ∗. For more
detail, see Lemma A.1 and Remark A.1 in the appendix.
If np = 1, then the strategy σ1(S) does not have a punishment phase, that is, S is a simple
type who plays the same stage-game action, as
1, in each period of the repeated game. Moreover,
22For games that satisfy Assumption 1, there are typically multiple dynamic Stackelberg strategies. We discuss our
particular choice of σ1(S) and other possible dynamic Stackelberg strategies in section 4.3.




2) arbitrarily as any one of
these action proﬁles.
24If Γ has SCI, then a
b
2 is a best response to a
s
1. If Γ has LNCI, then a
b
2 is not necessarily a best response to a
s
1. For
an example that satisﬁes Assumption 1 but where a
b
2 is not a best response to a
s
1, see ﬁgure 5.REPUTATION 12
player 2’s best response to σ1(S) entails playing ab
2 in each period for any discount factor.25 Thus,
if np = 1, then the static Stackelberg payoﬀ coincides with the dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ for any
discount factor (for example, see ﬁgure 1). If np > 1, then the dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ strictly













Figure 5. For this stage game as
1 = L, a
p
1 = R, and we pick ab
2 as the action that always
chooses move L. Hence, S plays L in the proﬁt phase, plays R in the two period punishment
phase, and np = 3. Notice that ab
2 is not a best response to as
1 in this example. However,
for suﬃciently high δ, player 2’s best response to σ1(S) is to play ab
2 in each period of the
repeated game. This is because playing ab
2 (instead of playing R after L) avoids the two
period punishment phase.
2.6. Equilibrium and beliefs. The analysis in the paper focuses on the perfect Bayesian equilibria
(PBE) of the game of incomplete information Γ∞( ,δ).27 In equilibrium, beliefs are obtained, where
possible, using Bayes’ rule given  ( |h0) =  ( ) and conditioning on players’ equilibrium strategies.
In what follows, we say that player 1 deviated from σ1(S) in the tth period of a period k public
history h if there exists a decision node d within period t ≤ k that is visited in the public history
h such that the move of player 1 in public history h at node d diﬀers from the move that strategy
σ1(S) would have chosen at node d. Notice that if  (S) > 0, then the belief  ( |h) is well deﬁned
after any period k public history h in which player 1 has not deviated from σ1(S).
3. The reputation result
Our main reputation result, Theorem 1, restricts attention to stage games of perfect information
that satisfy Assumption 1 and considers a repeated game Γ∞( ,δ) where  (S) > 0. Under these
assumptions, the theorem provides a lower bound on player 1’s payoﬀ in any PBE. Its formal
statement is given below.
25Notice that if n
p = 1 for a stage-game Γ, then by rewriting inequality (1) with n













2) = ¯ g1, i.e., if g1(a
s




26For a deﬁnition of the static Stackelberg payoﬀ, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006, chap. 15).
27For a precise statement of PBE, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Deﬁnition 8.2).REPUTATION 13
Theorem 1. Assume perfect information and Assumption 1. For any δ ∈ [0,1), any   ∈ ∆(Ω)
such that  (S) > 0, and any PBE strategy proﬁle σ of Γ∞( ,δ), we have
U1(σ,δ) ≥ ¯ g1 − f(z)max{1 − δ,φ},
where z =  (S), φ =  (Ω−)/ (S), and f is the decreasing, positive valued function deﬁned in
equation (10) in the appendix.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix. ￿
The theorem implies that as δ goes to one and  (Ω−) (the probability of other commitment types)
goes to zero, player 1’s payoﬀ converges to ¯ g1, his highest payoﬀ. Consequently, a normal type for
player 1 can secure a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to ¯ g1, his dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ, in any PBE of
the repeated game, for a suﬃciently high discount factor and for suﬃciently low probability mass on
other commitment types. Player 1 can attain the bound given in the theorem by simply mimicking
the Stackelberg type. Notice that the bound given in the theorem is not particularly sharp, if the
probability of other commitment types,  (Ω−), is substantial. However, under certain assumptions,
player 1 can receive a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to ¯ g1, with no restrictions on the probability of other













Figure 6. A game of perfect information with LNCI. Assume that l ∈ (0,1], a ∈ (0,1],
b ∈ [−1,1/2] and c ∈ [0,1/2]. If l = a = 1 and b = c = 1/2, then this is a battle-of-the-sexes
game. If l = 1, a = 3/4, b = −1 and c = 0, then this is a common interest game.
In order to demonstrate the implications of Theorem 1 and to make the intuition more transpar-
ently, we restate our reputation result for the example depicted in ﬁgure 6 as Corollary 1; a detailed
argument for Corollary 1 appears in section 3.2.2. In this example, the Stackelberg type S plays
U at each decision node of player 1, and player 1’s highest stage game payoﬀ is equal to one. Our
reputation result, for this particular example, is as follows:REPUTATION 14
Corollary 1. Suppose that the stage game Γ is given by ﬁgure 6 and assume that  (Ω−) = 0. For
any reputation level  (S) = z > 0, we have limδ→1 U1(σ(δ),δ) = 1, where σ(δ) is a PBE strategy












Figure 7. Assume that l ∈ (0,1], a ∈ (0,1], b ∈ [−1,1/2], and c ∈ [0,1/2]. This
simultaneous-move version of ﬁgure 6 is a game with LNCI.
Remark 1. If the stage game Γ is given by ﬁgure 7 instead of ﬁgure 6, then the reputation result
stated in Corollary 1 fails. We discuss this point further in Remark 2 and section 4.1.
3.1. The intuition for the reputation result. We now use ﬁgure 6 to convey the main intuition
driving our reputation result. Our result shows that a suﬃciently patient player 1 can receive a
payoﬀ approximately equal to one in any PBE by mimicking type S, i.e., by playing U in each
period of the repeated game. Equivalently, player 2 plays R, in only a payoﬀ-insigniﬁcant number
of periods against an opponent who repeatedly plays U.
There are two main incentives that may induce player 2 to play R after observing U in all previous
periods. The ﬁrst is a myopic incentive: she may expect player 1 to play D with high probability in
that period. The second is a nonmyopic incentive: she may expect her continuation payoﬀ after R
to be suﬃciently more attractive than her continuation payoﬀ after L. We show that neither myopic
nor nonmyopic incentives are suﬃciently strong to induce player 2 to play R against type S for a
payoﬀ-signiﬁcant number of periods. Myopic incentives are insuﬃcient, as in Fudenberg and Levine
(1989, 1992), since if player 1 is expected to reveal rationality with high probability, then he can
instead mimic type S, thereby increasing his reputation signiﬁcantly and obtaining a payoﬀ close
to one in the continuation game.
Nonmyopic incentives: For player 2 to play R in a period where player 1 plays D with small
probability, she must expect a punishment for playing L (or a reward for playing R) in the contin-
uation game. Type S always plays U; hence, any punishment (or reward) for player 2 must occur
after player 1 reveals rationality by playing D. Because player 1 moves after observing player 2’sREPUTATION 15
move (perfect information), he can continue to mimic type S instead of punishing player 2 after
observing L (or rewarding her after R). Hence, his payoﬀ while punishing (or rewarding) player 2
cannot diﬀer signiﬁcantly from his payoﬀ from mimicking type S. In other words, punishing (or
rewarding) player 2 cannot be costly for player 1. For the class of games that we consider, the
commitment payoﬀ of type S is equal to the highest payoﬀ of player 1. Moreover, for this class of
games, if player 1’s payoﬀ is close to his highest payoﬀ, then player 2’s payoﬀs are in a narrow range
(also see ﬁgure 4a). Therefore, if punishments (or rewards) are not costly for player 1, then player
2’s feasible continuation payoﬀs lie in a narrow range. Thus, the scope for nonmyopic incentives is
also limited.
3.2. The argument for the reputation result.
3.2.1. Preliminaries. Recall that (as
1,ab
2) ∈ A1 ×A2 is an action proﬁle such that g1(as
1,ab
2) is equal
to player 1’s highest stage game payoﬀ compatible with individual rationality. For ﬁgure 6, the
stage game action as
1 plays U after either L or R; and ab
2 is the best response to as
1, that is, ab
2 = L.
Also, for this game np = 1, i.e., the static and dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀs coincide and are equal
to one, for any discount factor.







￿ ≤ ρ|¯ g1 − g1|, for any (g1,g2) ∈ F.
For example in ﬁgure 6, any feasible payoﬀ proﬁle (g1,g2) satisﬁes inequality (2) for ρ = 1. Also, see
ﬁgure 4a for a depiction of inequality (2). The set of feasible payoﬀs in the repeated game is equal







￿ ≤ ρ|¯ g1 − U1(σ1,σ2,δ)|, for any pair (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2.
If Γ satisﬁes Assumption 1 (ii), then there exists a ﬁnite constant ρ ≥ 0 such that
(3) g2 − g2(as
1,ab
2) ≤ ρ(¯ g1 − g1), for any (g1,g2) ∈ F.REPUTATION 16




2) ≤ ρ(¯ g1 − U1(σ1,σ2,δ)), for any pair (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2.
We now introduce the resistance function, R( ,δ), which is central to the analysis that follows.
As a preliminary, we deﬁne the resistance of the strategy σ2 for player 2 as follows:
r(σ2,δ) = ¯ g1 − U1(σ1(S),σ2,δ).
For the example in ﬁgure 6, the resistance of strategy σ2 is equal to the expected discounted number
of periods in which (R,U) is played under the strategy proﬁle (σ1(S),σ2). That is, the resistance
of strategy σ2 is equal to the expected number of times a nonbest response is played by strategy
σ2 against the Stackleberg type. Notice that if player 2 uses strategy σ2 and her opponent uses
strategy σ1(S), then player 2’s payoﬀ, U2(σ1(S),σ2,δ), is equal to −lr(σ2,δ). This is because either
(R,U) or (L,U) is played in each period; and g2(R,U) = −l and g2(L,U) = 0.
The resistance function, R( ,δ), provides an upper bound on how much player 2 can resist (or
hurt) type S in any PBE of Γ∞( ,δ). It is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Resistance function). For any measure   ∈ ∆(Ω) and δ ∈ [0,1) let
R( ,δ) = sup{r(σ2,δ) : σ2 is part of a PBE proﬁle σ of Γ∞( ,δ)}.
3.2.2. The argument for Corollary 1. In this subsection we prove the reputation result given in
Corollary 1. At the end of the section we discuss the main argument for Theorem 1 that is given
in the Appendix. In what follows, because  (Ω−) = 0, we use z ∈ [0,1] to represent the measure  .
One should understand this to mean  (S) = z and  (N) = 1 − z.
In this section we work under the hypothesis that the resistance function R(z,δ) is a nonincreasing
function of z for each δ ∈ [0,1). We do this for expositional convenience only, as it allows us to
convey the main argument without the more technical details.28
At the start of any period t, if player 1’s reputation level is at least z > 0, then player 1 can
guarantee a continuation payoﬀ of at least 1 − R(z,δ) by playing according to the Stackelberg
28In the Appendix we instead work with the maximal resistance function ¯ R(z,δ) = sup{R(z
′,δ) : z
′ ≥ z}, which is
nonincreasing by deﬁnition.REPUTATION 17
strategy σ1(S). This follows from the deﬁnition of R, sequential rationality, and our assumption
that R is non-increasing. We will argue that limδ→1 R(z,δ) = 0, for any z > 0.
Consider a PBE σ of the repeated game Γ∞(z,δ). Suppose that the players are at a history in
which player 1 has played U in each period before t, and player 2 has played a2 ∈ {L,R} in period t.
Suppose further that player 1 plays D with positive probability at this decision node, i.e., player 1
reveals that he is not the Stackelberg type, with positive probability. Also, let player 1’s reputation
level be z′ > 0 at the start of period t+1, if he plays U instead of D. In the next lemma we bound
the continuation payoﬀ of player 2 by a linear function of R(z′,δ) at any such decision node. The
argument for the lemma is as follows: If player 1 is playing D with positive probability, then the
payoﬀ from playing D must be at least as large as the payoﬀ from playing U. However, if player 1
plays U, he gets at worst zero for the period, ensures that his reputation is z′ at the start of the
subsequent period, and thus guarantees 1 − R(z′,δ) at the start of period t + 1. Given this lower
bound on player 1’s continuation payoﬀ, the linear bound on player 2’s continuation payoﬀ follows
from inequality (2).
Lemma 1. Suppose z > 0. Pick any PBE σ of Γ∞(z,δ) and any period t public history of terminal
nodes ht where player 1 has played U in each period; and suppose player 1 plays D in period t given
history (ht,a2) with positive probability, where a2 ∈ {L,R}. Let z′ =  (S|ht,a2,U); then we have
|U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht,a2,D)| ≤ R(z′,δ) + (1 − δ)/δ.
Proof. If player 1 plays U in period t, then his reputation level is z′ =  (S|ht,a2,U) and he
can guarantee a continuation payoﬀ equal to 1 − R(z′,δ), by using σ1(S). Also, player 1 can
get at worst zero in period t by playing U. Consequently, his payoﬀ from playing U is at least
δU1(σ,δ|ht,a2,U) ≥ δ(1 − R(z′,δ)). If player 1 plays D instead, then he can get at most c for the
current period and δU1(σ,δ|ht,a2,D) as his continuation payoﬀ. Because player 1 is willing to play
D instead of U, we have (1−δ)c+δU1(σ,δ|ht,a2,D) ≥ δU1(σ,δ|ht,a2,U). Hence, U1(σ,δ|ht,a2,D) ≥
1 − R(z′,δ) − (1 − δ)c/δ ≥ 1 − R(z′,δ) − (1 − δ)/δ. The bound on player 2’s payoﬀ follows from
inequality (2) because the payoﬀ proﬁle (U1(σ,δ|ht,a2,D),U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht,a2,D)) is an element
of F and because the constant ρ is at most one for this particular game. Also see ﬁgure 8. ￿
Remark 2. Lemma 1 puts a bound on U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht,a2,D), not only for player 2’s equilibrium
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Figure 8. This ﬁgure depicts the payoﬀ player 1 can guarantee by playing
U and his payoﬀ if he plays D instead. In the ﬁgure, z′ =  (S|ht,L,U)
and z′′ =  (S|ht,R,U). If player 1 is to play D with positive probability
after R, then (1 − δ)c + δU1(σ,δ|ht,R,D) ≥ δ(1 − R(z′′,δ)). Consequently,
U1(σ,δ|ht,R,D) ≥ 1 − R(z′′,δ) − (1 − δ)c/δ, inequality (2), and ρ ≤ 1 together
imply that |U2(σ,δ|ht,R,D)| ≤ R(z′′,δ)+(1−δ)c/δ. Similarly, if player 1 is to play
D after L, then |U2(σ,δ|ht,L,D)| ≤ R(z′,δ) − (1 − δ)/δ.
suppose that the stage game Γ is given by the simultaneous-move game in ﬁgure 7. Further suppose,
in a given PBE σ after history ht, player 2 plays R with probability one and player 1 plays D
with positive probability. Then, as in Lemma 1, player 1’s ex-ante incentive constraint implies that
U1(σ,δ|ht,R,D) ≥ 1−R(z′,δ)−(1−δ)/δ. However, in contrast to Lemma 1, it is no longer possible
to assert that player 1’s ex-ante incentives require U1(σ,δ|ht,L,D) ≥ 1−R(z′,δ)−(1−δ)/δ; and as
a consequence, it is not possible to assert that |U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht,L,D)| ≤ ρ(R(z′,δ) + (1 − δ)/δ).
This is because player 1 chooses to play D before seeing player 2’s move (i.e., perfect information
is violated) and expects player 2 to play L with probability zero when making his choice; therefore
player 1’s continuation payoﬀ after (ht,L,D) does not aﬀect his ex-ante incentives. We discuss this
point further in section 4.1.
We now use Lemma 1 to sketch the argument for Corollary 1. Suppose that player 1’s reputation
level is z. Consider a PBE σ = (σ1(N),σ1(S),σ2) where player 2 resists the Stackelberg type by
approximately R(z,δ). In this PBE player 2 loses approximately lR(z,δ) in the event that player
1 is the Stackelberg type. We compare player 2’s payoﬀ in this PBE with her payoﬀ if she uses an
alternative strategy that plays L until player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time, and then reverts back to
the equilibrium strategy σ2. If player 2 uses the alternative strategy, then she avoids losing lR(z,δ)
in the event that player 1 is the Stackelberg type. We then use the fact that the PBE strategy σ2REPUTATION 19
must give player 2 a payoﬀ that is at least as great as the payoﬀ from using the alternative strategy.
This establishes a bound on R(z,δ), for any z suﬃciently close to 1.
Upper bound on player 2’s equilibrium payoﬀ. Suppose that player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time
in some period t. In each period up to period t, player 2 receives at most zero; in period t, she
receives at most 1−δ; and after period t, she receives at most R(z,δ) +(1−δ)/δ as a continuation
payoﬀ, by Lemma 1 and because R is nonincreasing. Consequently, player 2 gets at most δt(1 −
δ) + δt+1(R(z,δ) + (1 − δ)/δ) ≤ R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ), if player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in period t.
Alternatively, if player 1 plays U in each period, then player 2 receives at most −lR(z,δ). Player 1
will play U in every period with probability at least z because type S always plays U. So, player 1
will play D in some period t, with probability at most 1 − z. Thus, player 2’s payoﬀ in the PBE σ
is at most (1 − z)(R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ)) − zlR(z,δ). This line of reasoning is formalized by the upper
bound that we establish in Lemma 2 further below.
Lower bound on player 2’s equilibrium payoﬀ. Suppose that player 2 uses the alternative strategy
and player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period k. Player 2 receives at least −R(z,δ)−(1−δ)/δ
as a continuation payoﬀ after period k, by Lemma 1 and because R is nonincreasing. Also, she
receives zero in each period up to period k, because she plays L and player 1 plays U. In period k
she receives −a(1−δ) ≥ −(1−δ), because she plays L and player 1 plays D, and because a ∈ (0,1].
Alternatively, if player 1 plays U in every period, then player 2 receives zero. Player 1 will play D in
some period k, with probability at most 1−z. Consequently, if player 2 uses the alternative strategy,
then her payoﬀ is at least −(1−z)(δk(1−δ)+δk+1(R(z,δ)+(1−δ)/δ)) ≥ −(1−z)(R(z,δ)+2(1−δ)).
This line of reasoning is formalized by the lower bound that we establish in Lemma 3 further below.
Bounding resistance. The payoﬀ that player 2 gets from the equilibrium strategy σ2 must be at
least as great as the payoﬀ she receives from the alternative strategy. So, −(1−z)(R(z,δ)+2(1−δ)) ≤
(1 − z)(R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ)) − zlR(z,δ). Rearranging, R(z,δ) ≤ 4(1 − z)(1 − δ)/(lz − 2(1 − z)) ≤
4(1 − δ)/(lz − 2(1 − z)). Thus, for z suﬃciently close to one, i.e., if 1 − z ≤ q ≡ lz/4, then
R(z,δ) ≤ C(1 − δ) where C = 16/zl.29 Therefore, the resistance at reputation level z is very close
to zero, if δ is close to one.
More generally, the argument for Corollary 1 shows that for any two reputation levels z′′ >
z′ ≥ z such that z′/z′′ ≥ 1 − q, the resistance function satisﬁes the following functional inequality:
R(z′,δ) ≤ CR(z′′,δ) + C(1 − δ). That is, decreasing player 1’s reputation level by a factor of 1 − q
29To be precise, if z ≥ z and 1 − z ≤ lz/4, then lz − 2(1 − z) ≥ lz/2. Hence, R(z,δ) ≤ 4(1 − δ)/lz/2 = 8(1 − δ)/lz ≤
16(1 − δ)/lz.REPUTATION 20
increases resistance by at most a factor of C plus an additive term equal to C(1 − δ). Observe
that we can recover the inequality that we established in the previous paragraph by substituting
z′ = 1 − q and z′′ = 1 into the functional inequality and by using the fact that R(1,δ) = 0. ﬁgure
9 depicts the upper bound on resistance implied by this functional inequality. Notice that for any
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Upper bound on R(z,δ)
Figure 9. Resistance’s upper bound as a function of ln(z). This upper bound is
implied by the functional inequality R(z′,δ) ≤ CR(z′′,δ) + C(1 − δ) that holds for
any z′′ > z′ ≥ z such that z′/z′′ ≥ 1 − q. The reputation levels zn, that are shown
on the x-axis, are such that lnzn − lnzn+1 = ln(1 − q) for each n.
We now proceed with the formal proof of Corollary 1 by establishing an upper and a lower bound
(Lemmata 2 and 3) for player 2’s PBE payoﬀs. Deﬁnition 2 below introduces a stopping time which
we use in constructing the upper and the lower bound.
Deﬁnition 2 (Stopping time). For an integer k, let E[0,k] denote the event (set of inﬁnite public
histories) where player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in period t for some t ∈ {0,...,k}. For any
strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,σ1(S),σ2), and for reputation levels z > 0 and z′ > z, let
T(σ,z,z′) = min{k ∈ {0,1,2,...} : z/(1 − π(k)) ≥ z′},
where π(k) = (1 − z)Pr(σ1,σ2)[E[0,k]]; and let T(σ,z,z′) = ∞ if the set is empty. Notice that
Pr(σ1,σ2)[E[0,k]] is the probability that player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in period t for some t ∈
{0,...,k}, if player 1 is using strategy σ1 and player 2 is using strategy σ2.REPUTATION 21
Intuitively, the stopping time T(σ,z,z′) gives the ﬁrst period in which player 1’s reputation level
exceeds z′, if his initial reputation level is z and if the players use strategy proﬁle σ. The speciﬁc
implications of Deﬁnition 2, that we use in Lemmata 2 and 3, are summarized in the following
remark:
Remark 3. Suppose that player 1’s initial reputation level is z and suppose that z′ > z. Let
σ∗ = (σ1(N),σ1(S),σ∗
2) be any strategy proﬁle where σ∗
2 is a pure strategy. Let T = T(σ∗,z,z′). By
deﬁnition, the total probability that player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in any period t ≤ T −1 (i.e.,
π(T −1) in the terminology used in Deﬁnition 2) is at most 1−z/z′. Also, because both σ1(S) and
σ∗
2 are pure strategies, we have the following:
(i) There is a unique public history of terminal nodes hT+1 consistent with strategies σ1(S) and
σ∗
2.
(ii) If hT+1 is the unique history consistent with σ1(S) and σ∗
2 (i.e., player 1 has always played
U in all periods up to and including period T), then Bayes’ rule implies that  (S|hT+1) ≥ z′.
Lemma 2 (Upper bound). Suppose 0 ≤ z < z′ ≤ 1. Let σ = (σ1(N),σ1(S),σ2) denote a PBE of
Γ∞(z,δ) where player 2’s resistance is at least R(z,δ) − ǫ and ǫ > 0. Then,
(4) U2(σ,δ) ≤ q(R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ)) + R(z′,δ) + 2(1 − δ) − zl(R(z,δ) − ǫ)
where q = 1 − z/z′.
Proof. Let σ∗
2 denote a pure strategy in the support of σ2 such that the resistance of σ∗
2 is at least
R(z,δ) − ǫ. Since the resistance of σ2 is at least R(z,δ) − ǫ, there must be a pure strategy in the
support of σ2 that has resistance of at least R(z,δ) − ǫ. Let proﬁle σ∗ = (σ1(N),σ1(S),σ∗
2) and let
T = T(σ∗,z,z′). As we argued in Remark 3, player 1’s reputation exceeds z′ at the end of period
T if player 1 plays U and if player 2 plays according to σ∗
2, in all periods up to and including T.
We bound player 2’s payoﬀs from σ∗
2 in the following three events: (i) The event where player 1
plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period t < T; the probability of this event is at most q = 1−z/z′
by Remark 3. (ii) The event where player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period t ≥ T; the
probability of this event is at most 1. (iii) The event where player 1 never plays D; the probability
of this event is at least z, because S never plays D. These three events are exhaustive.
In a period where player 1 plays U, player 2 receives at most zero. Consequently, player 2’s total
payoﬀ in all the periods until player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time is at most zero.REPUTATION 22
If event (i) occurs and player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period t, then player 2 receives
zero until period t, receives at most (1 − δ) in period t,30 and knows with certainty that she faces
the normal type N. Hence, she receives a continuation payoﬀ of at most R(z,δ) + (1 − δ)/δ by
Lemma 1 and because R is nonincreasing. So if event (i) occurs, then player 2’s payoﬀ is at most
R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ) because
R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ) ≥ δt(1 − δ) + δt+1(R(z,δ) + (1 − δ)/δ) for any period t.
If event (ii) occurs and player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period t, then player 2 receives
zero until period t, receives at most (1 − δ) in period t, and receives a continuation payoﬀ of at
most R(z′,δ)+(1−δ)/δ, by Lemma 1 and because R is nonincreasing. So if event (ii) occurs, then
player 2’s payoﬀ is at most R(z′,δ) + 2(1 − δ) because
R(z′,δ) + 2(1 − δ) ≥ δt(1 − δ) + δt+1(R(z′,δ) + (1 − δ)/δ) for any period t.
If event (iii) occurs, then player 1 plays U in each period; player 2’s payoﬀ in this event is at
most −l(R(z,δ) − ǫ). This is because the resistance of σ∗
2 is at least R(z,δ) − ǫ.
Putting the bounds on player 2’s payoﬀs in the three events together, we obtain:
U2(σ∗,δ) ≤ q(R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ)) + R(z′,δ) + 2(1 − δ) − zl(R(z,δ) − ǫ).
Recall that σ∗
2 is in the support of PBE strategy σ2. Consequently, we have U2(σ∗,δ) = U2(σ,δ)
which implies the following:
U2(σ,δ) ≤ q(R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ)) + R(z′,δ) + 2(1 − δ) − zl(R(z,δ) − ǫ).
￿
Lemma 3 (Lower bound). Suppose 0 ≤ z < z′ ≤ 1. In any PBE σ of Γ∞(z,δ), we have
(5) U2(σ,δ) ≥ −q(R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ)) − R(z′,δ) − 2(1 − δ),
where q = 1 − z/z′.
Proof. Pick any PBE σ of Γ∞(z,δ). Let σ∗
2 denote a pure strategy that moves according to ab
2
after any period k public history hk that is consistent with σ1(S); and that coincides with a pure
30Player 2’s highest stage game payoﬀ is one in this game.REPUTATION 23
strategy in the support of the PBE strategy σ2 if hk is not consistent with σ1(S). Let strategy
proﬁle σ∗ = (σ1(N),σ1(S),σ∗
2), and let T = T(σ∗,z,z′). As we argued in Remark 3, player 1’s
reputation exceeds z′ at the end of period T if player 1 plays U and if player 2 plays according to
σ∗
2, in all periods up to and including T.
Once again we bound player 2’s payoﬀ from strategy σ∗
2 in the following three events: (i) The
event where player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period t < T; the probability of this event
is at most q, by Remark 3. (ii) The event where player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period
t ≥ T; the probability of this event is at most 1. (iii) The event that player 1 never plays D.
Player 2’s payoﬀ until player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time is at most zero. If event (i) occurs
and player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period t, then player 2 receives zero until period t,
receives at worst −a(1 − δ) ≥ −(1 − δ) in period t, and receives a continuation payoﬀ of at worst
−R(z,δ) − (1 − δ)/δ, by Lemma 1 and because R is nonincreasing. Consequently, player 2’s payoﬀ
is at least −R(z,δ) − 2(1 − δ) because
−δt(1 − δ) − δt+1(R(z,δ) + (1 − δ)/δ) ≥ −R(z,δ) − 2(1 − δ).
If event (ii) occurs and player 1 plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period t, then player 2 receives
zero until period t, receives at worst −(1 − δ) in period t, and receives a continuation payoﬀ of at
worst −R(z′,δ)−(1−δ)/δ, by Lemma 1 and because R is non-increasing. Consequently, player 2’s
payoﬀ is at least −R(z′,δ) − 2(1 − δ) because
−δt(1 − δ) − δt+1(R(z′,δ) + (1 − δ)/δ) ≥ −R(z′,δ) − 2(1 − δ).
If event (iii) occurs, then player 1 never plays D and consequently player 2 receives zero. Putting
the bounds on player 2’s payoﬀs in the three events together implies that:
U2(σ∗,δ) ≥ −q(R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ)) − R(z′,δ) − 2(1 − δ).
Because σ2 is player 2’s PBE strategy we have U2(σ,δ) ≥ U2(σ∗,δ). Consequently,
U2(σ,δ) ≥ −q(R(z,δ) + 2(1 − δ)) − R(z′,δ) − 2(1 − δ).
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Below we use the fact that the upper bound provided in Lemma 2 must exceed the lower bound
given in Lemma 3 to obtain a functional inequality that relates maximal resistance at any two
reputation levels. We then use this functional inequality to complete our proof.
Lemma 4 (Functional Inequality). For any z ∈ [z,1] and z < z′ ≤ 1, we have
(6) R(z,δ)(zl − 2q) ≤ 2R(z′,δ) + 8(1 − δ),
where q = 1 − z/z′.
Proof. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a PBE σ of Γ∞(z,δ) where player 2’s resistance is at least
R(z,δ) − ǫ, by the deﬁnition of the resistance function. By Lemma 2, inequality (4) holds for
any ǫ > 0 and any PBE σ where player 2’s resistance is at least R(z,δ) − ǫ. Also, the upper
bound given by inequality (4) must exceed the lower bound given by inequality (5) for any PBE σ.
Combining (4) and (5), taking the limit as ǫ goes to zero, and substituting z for z together imply
that R(z,δ)(zl − 2q) ≤ 4R(z′,δ) + 4(1 + q)(1 − δ). Using q ≤ 1 then delivers inequality (6). ￿
Proof of Corollary 1 under the hypothesis that R is nonincreasing. Let q = zl/4 and let ¯ n be the
smallest integer such that (1 − q)¯ n ≤ z. We will show that R(z,δ) ≤ (1 − δ)
P¯ n
j=1 Cj where
C = 16/zl and hence 0 ≤ limδ→1 R(z,δ) ≤ limδ→1(1 − δ)
P¯ n
j=1Cj = 0.
If z,z′ ∈ [z,1] and z ∈ [z′(1 − q),z′], then 1 − z/z′ ≤ q. Hence, substituting q for q = 1 − z/z′ in
inequality (6) delivers the following:
R(z,δ)(zl − 2q) ≤ 2R(z′,δ) + 8(1 − δ).




(R(z′,δ) + 4(1 − δ)).
Substituting C for 16/zl in the previous inequality and using the fact that R(z′,δ) ≥ 0 we obtain
the following:
(7) R(z,δ) ≤ CR(z′,δ) + C(1 − δ).
If z ≥ z and z ∈ [1 − q,1], then substituting z′ = 1 into inequality (7) we obtain the following:
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for z,z′ ∈ [z,1] such that z ∈ [z′(1 − q),z′]. Notice that R(1,δ) = 0. Consequently, if z ≥ z and
z ∈ [1 − q,1], then R(z,δ) ≤ C(1 − δ).
More generally, we will show that if z ≥ z and if z ∈ [(1 − q)n,(1 − q)n−1], then R(z,δ) ≤
(1 − δ)
Pn
j=1Cj by using induction on n. We make the inductive hypothesis that if z ≥ z and if
z ∈ [(1 − q)k−1,(1 − q)k−2], then we have R(z,δ) ≤ (1 − δ)
Pk−1
j=1 Cj.
If z ≥ z and z ∈ [(1 − q)k,(1 − q)k−1], then substituting (1 − q)k−1 for z′ in inequality (7) gives
us the following:
(8) R(z,δ) ≤ CR((1 − q)k−1,δ) + C(1 − δ).
However, inequality (8) and the inductive hypothesis together show that if z ≥ z and z ∈ [(1 −
q)k,(1 − q)k−1], then R(z,δ) ≤ (1 − δ)
Pk
j=1 Cj, completing the induction.
The deﬁnition of ¯ n implies that z ∈ [(1 − q)¯ n,(1 − q)¯ n−1], and consequently, R(z,δ) ≤ (1 −
δ)
P¯ n
j=1 Cj. See ﬁgure 9 for a depiction of this argument. ￿
3.2.3. Description of the proof of Theorem 1. Our discussion up to this point established a reputa-
tion result for the game depicted in ﬁgure 6. Here we describe the additional arguments we use to
prove Theorem 1. In particular, we sketch the steps involved in allowing for the Stackelberg type
that uses punishments (i.e., np > 1) and allowing for other commitment types (i.e.,  (Ω−) > 0).
In order to accommodate the Stackelberg type who punishes player 2, i.e., the case where np > 1,
we prove Lemmata A.1 and A.2. Lemma A.1 shows that player 2 faces an average per-period cost,
l > 0, for not best responding to the Stackelberg type. Lemma A.2 is an analog of Lemma 1 that
accounts for punishment phases. This lemma is needed because at any node where player 1 deviates
from σ1(S) under equilibrium play, if he instead plays according to σ1(S) in order to maintain his
reputation, then he may have to carry-out an np − 1 period punishment phase.
Allowing for  (Ω−) > 0 requires accounting for the event where player 2 faces another commit-
ment type in the lower and upper bound calculations. In particular, we show that the eﬀect of the
other commitment types is at most ±M (Ω−) on the lower bound and the upper bound. This is
because player 1 is another commitment type with probability  (Ω−), and because player 2 can
gain or lose at most M against any type. Consequently, if  (Ω−) is small, then the eﬀect of other
commitment types on the functional inequality is also small.
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4.1. Without perfect information, the reputation result can fail. For example, without
perfect information a folk theorem applies to the simultaneous-move common interest game in
ﬁgure 3a (Cripps and Thomas, 1997), which has LNCI. For a reputation result in repeated games
with SCI, the perfect information assumption is not required (Cripps et al. (2005) or section 4.6 in
this paper).
Corollary 1 provides a reputation result for the repeated sequential common interest game.31
Lemma 1 is central for establishing Corollary 1 and the perfect-information assumption is required
for Lemma 1. In order to ﬂesh out the intuition of why perfect information is necessary, we construct
a PBE for the repeated simultaneous-move common interest game given in ﬁgures 3a (where we
take x = 0), where there is no analog of Lemma 1. In this PBE, the players’ payoﬀs are low if z is
close to zero and δ is close to one.32 That is, the failure of Lemma 1 also leads to the failure of the
reputation result.
Suppose player 2 plays R and player 1 uses a mixed strategy that plays D with small probability
for the ﬁrst K periods. After the ﬁrst K periods, (L,U) is played forever. In this construction
U1(σ) = U2(σ) = δK . Also, the continuation payoﬀ for the players, after (R,D) or (R,U), is
equal to δK−t in any period t ∈ {0,..,K − 1}. To ensure that player 2 has an incentive to play
R, she is punished in the event that she plays L and player 1 plays D (thus revealing rationality).
Punishment entails a continuation payoﬀ for player 2 that is close to zero.33 Player 1 is willing to
mix between U and D in the ﬁrst K periods since player 2 only plays R on the equilibrium path.
In this construction, player 2 is deterred from playing L, even if player 1 reveals rationality with a
small probability in each period, because her continuation payoﬀ is close to zero at (L,D). However,
if the probability that player 1 reveals rationality is small in each period, then it takes many periods
for player 1 to build a reputation and K can be chosen large to ensure low payoﬀs for both players.
This argument hinges on choosing low continuation payoﬀs for player 2 after terminal node (L,D),
during the ﬁrst K periods. This does not conﬂict with player 1’s incentive to play D instead of U,
even if low continuation payoﬀs for player 2 also implies low continuation payoﬀs for player 1, after
node (L,D). This is because, in the ﬁrst K periods, when player 1 makes his move, he expects
player 2 to play L with probability zero and the terminal node (L,D) is reached with probability
31This is because ﬁgure 6 is a normalized sequential common interest game if a = 1 and b = −1.
32This construction follows Cripps and Thomas (1997).
33After (L,D) or (R,D), the continuation game is a repeated game of complete information and any payoﬀ in [0,1]
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zero. Thus, payoﬀs at node (L,D) have no eﬀect on player 1’s ex-ante incentive to play D and
consequently player 1’s incentive constraint puts no restrictions on player 2’s continuation payoﬀ
at (L,D). In contrast, if player 1 moves after observing player 2, as in ﬁgure 2a, then as shown in
Lemma 1, player 1’s incentive constraint implies that player 2’s continuation payoﬀ after (L,D) is
at least 1 − R(z′,δ) − (1 − δ)/δ, i.e., player 1’s incentive to play D instead of U imposes a bound
on the amount of punishment that player 2 can expect after choosing L.
For our reputation result we make extensive use of Lemma 1 in establishing the upper and lower
bounds for player 2’s payoﬀs (Lemma 2 and Lemma 3). In Lemma 2, player 2’s payoﬀ is bounded
along the equilibrium path. Consequently, in this lemma the perfect information assumption is not
required. Consider again the equilibrium described for the simultaneous-move game. The bound in
Lemma 1 applies without alteration to the simultaneous-move game at node (R,D) (the node of
interest for Lemma 2), because player 1 believes that player 2 plays R with probability one on the
equilibrium path.
In contrast to Lemma 2, perfect information is essential for Lemma 3. In Lemma 3 we consider
a strategy for player 2 that plays L until player 1 deviates from U, and we give a lower bound for
player 2’s payoﬀ after (L,D). Lemma 1 provides a lower bound on player 2’s payoﬀ after (L,D)
in the case of perfect information. However, there is no analog to Lemma 1 that provides a tight
bound on player 2’s payoﬀ after (L,D) for the simultaneous-move game. For example, in the PBE
we construct we can put no restrictions on payoﬀs after node (L,D) beyond individual rationality
and feasibility. This is because player 1 expects to reach node (L,D) with probability zero.
4.2. Without Assumption 1, the reputation result can fail. Assumption 1 can fail in two
ways. First, Assumption 1 fails if the payoﬀ proﬁle where player 1 receives ¯ g1 is not unique in G
(for example, if Γ is nongeneric). Such a failure is depicted in ﬁgure 10a. Second, Assumption 1
fails if, (¯ g1, ˆ g2) ∈ G, but Γ is not a strictly conﬂicting interests game. Such a failure is depicted in
ﬁgure 10b. Below we demonstrate that a reputation result can fail to obtain in these examples.
In the nongeneric common interest game depicted in ﬁgure 10a, suppose that the Stackelberg type
of player 1 always plays U and  (S) < 1/2. We describe a PBE where player 1 receives a payoﬀ
strictly lower than one. Suppose on the equilibrium path (R,U) is played in the ﬁrst K periods
and (L,U) is played thereafter. Player 1 does not build a reputation in this PBE. Choose K such
that both players receive a payoﬀ equal to 1/2. Suppose that if player 2 deviates from equilibrium























(b) The product choice game.
Figure 10. Games that fail to satisfy Assumption 1.
equilibrium (L,D) is played thereafter. Consequently, player 2 receives  (S) if she deviates from
the equilibrium strategy which is less than her equilibrium payoﬀ 1/2.
In the product choice game depicted in ﬁgure 10b, player 1’s dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ is 1.5
and player 2’s minimax value is zero.34 Although a dynamic Stackelberg strategy does not exist
in this game, there are strategies that deliver a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to the dynamic Stackelberg
payoﬀ. Suppose that player 1’s mixed actions are observed at the end of each period. One might
conjecture that player 1 can obtain a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to the dynamic Stackelberg payoﬀ by
mimicking a type, ω∗, that plays H with probability 1/2+ǫ. However, this is not the case: Suppose
that on the equilibrium path player 1 plays H with probability 1/2+ǫ, in each period. Player 2 plays
N for the ﬁrst K periods and plays B thereafter. Choose K such that δK = 1/2. Consequently, no
reputation is built on the equilibrium path and equilibrium payoﬀs are ((1.5−ǫ)/2,ǫ/2). If player 1
deviates from equilibrium and reveals rationality, then player 2 plays N forever. If player 2 deviates
from equilibrium and plays B, then player 1 reveals rationality by playing L. In the subsequent
complete-information game an equilibrium with payoﬀs (1.5,0) is played.35 This construction is a
PBE for any choice of ǫ, if  (ω∗) < 1/2: If player 2 deviates and plays B, then she is facing ω∗ with
probability  (ω∗) and receives payoﬀ equal to ǫ. Alternatively, she is facing the normal type with
probability 1 −  (ω∗) and receives payoﬀ equal to zero. However,  (ω∗)ǫ < ǫ/2.
4.3. The Stackelberg type. In the repeated games that we consider here, the dynamic Stackelberg
strategy is not necessarily unique. For example in the game depicted in ﬁgure 5, the grim-trigger
strategy is also a dynamic Stackelberg strategy. Mimicking the grim-trigger strategy would, however,
34In this stage-game, the Stackelberg payoﬀ is also equal to 1.5 because, for any ǫ > 0, player 1 can guarantee a
payoﬀ equal to 1.5 − ǫ by playing H with probability 1/2 + ǫ. Yet a Stackelberg action does not exist. The unique
action proﬁle that yields player 1 a payoﬀ exactly equal to 1.5 has player one mixing between H and L with equal
probability and player two playing B. However, both B and N are best responses to player 1’s equal mixture and
if player 2 best responds by playing N instead of B, then player 1’s payoﬀ is equal zero. Therefore, player 1 cannot
guarantee 1.5 by committing to this mixed action, i.e., a Stackelberg action does not exist.
35Playing (N,L) in each period is a PBE of the complete information repeated game. Consequently, the threat of
switching to (N,L) can incentivize a patient player 1 to play H with probability 1/2 in each period.REPUTATION 29
not give player 1 a high payoﬀ. This is because the punishment phase is also very costly for player
1. In contrast, the particular Stackelberg type that we choose is not very costly to mimic since the
punishment phase is short, i.e., np is chosen minimally. If we had chosen any other ﬁnite length
n > np for the punishment phase instead of np, our reputation result would still hold.
4.4. Other commitment types. As noted previously by Schmidt (1993), Celentani et al. (1996),
or Evans and Thomas (1997), if there is a chance that player 1 is a commitment type other than
the Stackelberg type, then player 1 may be unable to build a reputation. Previous work has
addressed this issue by assuming that types are learned due to exogenous noise (Celentani et al.
(1996) or Aoyagi (1996)), by restricting the class of games (Schmidt, 1993), or by considering more
complicated types (Evans and Thomas, 1997).
In the environment we consider, the presence of commitment types can also hinder player 1
from building a reputation. A patient player 2 may resist the Stackelberg type because she fears
punishment or expects a reward for not best responding, either from another commitment type
or from player 1’s normal type. Accordingly, our reputation result holds because, as we show,
punishments or rewards cannot come from player 1’s normal type; and because we assume that the
probability of another commitment type is small compared to the probability of the Stackelberg
type.
The restriction on the relative likelihood of other commitment types can be relaxed if the other
commitment types are uniformly learnable. A uniformly learnable type reveals itself not to be the
Stackelberg type at a rate that is bounded away from zero, uniformly across all histories. If the
other commitment types are uniformly learnable, then player 1 can play according to σ1(S), thereby
ensuring that player 2’s posterior belief that player 1 is a type in Ω− is arbitrarily small in ﬁnitely
many periods. If player 2’s posterior belief that player 1 is a type in Ω− is small, then Theorem
1 implies that player 1’s payoﬀ is close to one for suﬃciently large discount factors. However, the
restriction to uniformly learnable types is a nontrivial assumption. For example, it rules out the
“perverse” type (see Schmidt, 1993) who plays like the Stackelberg type on the equilibrium path
but responds to deviations in a history-dependent way.
In previous work, Schmidt (1993) and Celentani et al. (1996) establish reputation results with a
nonmyopic player 2, even when the set of commitment types is arbitrary. Celentani et al. (1996)
assume that player 2’s moves are imperfectly observed with full support.36 This assumption ensures
36Also, see Aoyagi (1996) for a similar assumption.REPUTATION 30
that all relevant histories are sampled with positive probability without any experimentation by
player 2. If player 2’s moves are imperfectly observed, then a rich set of commitment types is
uniformly learnable. A similar assumption would also enable us to allow for a rich set of commitment
types in the framework that we consider here.37
The reputation result of Schmidt (1993) obtains if there are conﬂicting interests in the stage
game, player 2’s discount factor is ﬁxed, and player 1 is arbitrarily more patient. Conﬂicting
interests imply that the punishment that player 2 can expect from any other commitment type
(her minimax payoﬀ) is no worse than best responding to the Stackelberg type and receiving her
minimax payoﬀ. A commitment type may also reward player 2 for not best responding to the
Stackelberg type. But since player 2’s discount factor is ﬁxed, a reward for player 2 must entail
behavior, that diﬀers from the Stackelberg type and that occurs in a bounded number of periods
T. If player 1 is suﬃciently patient, then he can mimic the Stackelberg type for these T periods,
depriving player 2 of the reward and thus building a reputation. However, rewards for an equally
patient player 2 need not accrue in a bounded number of periods. A commitment type that rewards
player 2 for resisting the Stackelberg type, in a history-dependent manner can hinder player 1 from
building a reputation against an equally patient opponent, even with strictly conﬂicting interests.
4.5. Two-sided incomplete information. The reputation results in games with asymmetric
discounting are robust to the introduction of two-sided uncertainty, while the reputation result
that we present in this paper is not. In order to obtain our one-sided reputation result we al-
low for only one-sided uncertainty. In other words, we replace asymmetric discount factors as in
Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992), or Celentani et al. (1996), with one-sided asymmetric informa-
tion.
In a related paper, Atakan and Ekmekci (2008b), we consider a repeated game of perfect informa-
tion with equally patient agents, two-sided LNCI or SCI, and two-sided uncertainty. In this related
paper, we show two results: First, the repeated game has a unique equilibrium if the players are
suﬃciently patient. Second, under certain additional conditions, in the unique equilibrium of the
repeated game, a war-of-attrition (similar to Abreu and Gul (2000)) is played prior to one player
revealing herself to be the normal type, and once this has occurred, an equilibrium of the game of
one-sided incomplete information, as characterized in Theorem 1, is played.
37See Atakan and Ekmekci (2008a), which assumes player 2’s moves are imperfectly observed with full support; under
this assumption it shows that the set of other types can be taken as the set of all ﬁnite automata and the perfect
information assumption can be dropped.REPUTATION 31
4.6. Simultaneous-move games with SCI. Cripps et al. (2005) obtain a reputation result for
the Bayes-Nash equilibria of repeated simultaneous-move games with SCI. A similar result can
be obtained using the method we develop here. In particular, redeﬁne R(z,δ) using Bayes-Nash
equilibrium instead of PBE. The upper bound established in Lemma A.3 remains valid for Bayes-
Nash equilibria. This is because all the arguments were constructed on the equilibrium path without
any appeal to perfect information or sequential rationality. Also, U2(σ) ≥ ˆ g2 = 0 in any Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. Consequently, functional inequality (6) holds, and a reputation result follows.
4.7. Reputation in dynamic games. We do not know whether our reputation result extends
to more general dynamic games where a diﬀerent stage game is played in each period. However,
in the following restricted class of dynamic games our reputation result also holds: any one of a
ﬁnite number of stage games of perfect information is played in each period. All these stage games
satisfy Assumption 1. The stage game which is played in a particular period is determined by a
transition function, the transitions are stationary, and the transitions depend only on which game
was played in the previous period, but not on the outcome of the game played in the previous
period. For example, if the battle-of-the-sexes game in ﬁgure 1 is played in the odd periods and if
the battle-of-the-sexes game in ﬁgure 2d is played in the even periods, then our reputation result
would hold.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Normalize payoﬀs, without loss of generality, such that
(9) ¯ g1 = 1; g1(a1,a2) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A; and g2(as
1,ab
2) = 0.
Recall that M = max{max{|g1|,|g2|} : (g1,g2) ∈ F}, hence M ≥ 1.
For any z ∈ (0,1], let K(z) = max{
4ρ
zl, 8M
zl (ρnp + 2),2}. For any z ∈ (0,1] let
(10) f(z) = K(z)¯ n(z),
where ¯ n(z) is the smallest positive integer j such that (1 − zl/4ρ)
j−1 < z. Note that both K and
¯ n are decreasing, positive valued functions of z. Hence, f : (0,1] → R++ is a decreasing, positive
valued function.REPUTATION 32
In what follows, we ﬁx constant z > 0, and we ﬁx constants
(11) K = K(z), and ¯ n = ¯ n(z).
Also, we ﬁx constant φ ∈ [0,1). We show that for any   ∈ ∆(Ω) such that  (S) ≥ z and
 (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ, and for any PBE strategy proﬁle σ of Γ∞( ,δ), the following inequality holds
U1(σ,δ) ≥ 1 − f(z)max{1 − δ,φ} ≥ 1 − K¯ n max{1 − δ, (Ω−)/ (S)}.
Lemma A.1. Posit perfect information and Assumption 1. There exists δ∗ ∈ [0,1) and l > 0 such
that for any r ≥ 0, if U1(σ1(S),σ2,δ) = 1 − r, then U2(σ1(S),σ2,δ) ≤ −lr, for all δ > δ∗.
Proof. The deﬁnition of np given in inequality (1) implies that there exists a δ∗ < 1 and l > 0 such
that, for all δ > δ∗, and for any a2 ∈ A2 such that g1(as
1,a2) < 1 and any a′









For public history ht = (y0,y1,...,yt), let i(ht) = 1, if g1(yt) < 1 and σ1(S,ht) = as
1; and i(ht) = 0,
otherwise. Player 1 receives at least zero in any period t where i(ht) = 1 and also receives at least
zero in the subsequent np − 1 period punishment phase. In all other periods player 1 receives one.
Consequently,











≥ r/np.38 If i(ht) = 1, then player 2 receives a total discounted
payoﬀ of at most −npl(1 − δ) for periods t through t + np − 1, if δ > δ∗ by inequality (12). In any
period where as
1 is played and i(ht)=0, player 2 receives zero. Consequently,







if δ > δ∗. ￿
Remark A.1. We argue that UC
1 (σ1(S),δ) = 1, i.e., σ1(S) is a dynamic Stackelberg strategy, for
all δ > δ∗. Lemma A.1 implies that if U1(σ1(S),σ2,δ) < 1, then U2(σ1(S),σ2,δ) < 0, for all δ > δ∗.
Thus, if U2(σ1(S),σ2,δ) ≥ 0, then U1(σ1(S),σ2,δ) ≥ 1, for all δ > δ∗. If player 2 plays ab
2 in
each period of the repeated game against σ1(S), then player 2’s payoﬀ is equal to zero. Therefore,
38The bound on player 1’s payoﬀ is crude, especially for low δ.REPUTATION 33
if σ2 ∈ BR(σ1(S),δ), then U2(σ1(S),σ2,δ) ≥ 0 and as a consequence U1(σ1(S),σ2,δ) ≥ 1, for all
δ > δ∗. Also, if σ2 ∈ BR(σ1(S),δ), then U2(σ1(S),σ2,δ) is at least as large as player 2’s minimax.
Hence, if σ2 ∈ BR(σ1(S),δ), then U1(σ1(S),σ2,δ) = 1, for all δ > δ∗. This follows because player
1’s highest payoﬀ compatible with player 2’s individual rationality is equal to one.
In what follows, we assume that δ > δ∗, where δ∗ is the cutoﬀ established in Lemma A.1.
Deﬁnition A.1. For any z ∈ (0,1], deﬁne the maximal resistance function as follows:
¯ R(z,δ) = sup{R( ,δ) :   ∈ ∆,  (S) ≥ z,  (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ}+,
where ∆ is the set of all measures over Σ1 ∪ {N} with countable support, each commitment type is
identiﬁed by the strategy that it plays, and Ω is the support of  .39
Remark A.2. Deﬁnition A.1 implies that ¯ R( ,δ) : (0,1] → [0,1] is a nonincreasing function.
Lemma A.2. Suppose that  (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ. Pick any PBE σ of Γ∞( ,δ), and any period t public
history h = (ht,d0); and suppose player 1 deviates from σ1(S) at node d0 with positive probability.
Let ht+1 be any public history of terminal nodes that is reached with positive probability under
Pr(σ1(N)|h,σ2|h); and let h′ = (ht,d′) be the public history that is reached immediately (with positive
probability under Pr(σ1(S)|h,σ2|h)) if σ1(S) is used at d. For any z′ > 0, if  (S|h′) ≥ z′, then
|U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht+1)| ≤ ρ( ¯ R(z′,δ) + npM(1 − δ)/δ), if Γ satisﬁes Ass. 1 (i); and
U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht+1) ≤ ρ( ¯ R(z′,δ) + npM(1 − δ)/δ), if Γ satisﬁes Ass. 1 (ii).
Proof. Note that player 1’s reputation level  (S|h′) ≥ z′ and  (Ω−|h′)/ (S|h′) ≤ φ. Therefore, if
a history (hk,d′′) is consistent with σ1(S) and if the node speciﬁed by the history (hk,d′′) comes
after the node speciﬁed by the history (ht,d′), then player 1’s reputation level  (S|hk,d′′) ≥ z′ and
 (Ω−|hk,d′′)/ (S|hk,d′′) ≤ φ. If player 1 plays according to σ1(S) at d0 and through the remaining
nodes of period t, then he obtains at least zero for the period and an np − 1 period punishment
phase may ensue. His payoﬀ is at least zero in these periods. Consequently, if he plays according
to σ1(S), his payoﬀ is at least:
0 × (1 − δnp
) + δnp
(1 − ¯ R(z′,δ)) = δnp
(1 − ¯ R(z′,δ)),
39For any a ∈ R, a
+ = max{a,0}.REPUTATION 34
because ¯ R is nonincreasing. Alternatively, if he chooses a move that diﬀers from the move that
σ1(S) would have chosen, then he receives at most M(1−δ) for the period, and U1(σ,δ|ht+1) as his
continuation payoﬀ. Therefore, M(1 − δ) + δU1(σ,δ|ht+1) ≥ δnp
(1 − ¯ R(z′,δ)). This implies:
U1(σ,δ|ht+1) ≥ δnp−1(1 − ¯ R(z′,δ)) − M(1 − δ)/δ ≥ 1 − ¯ R(z′,δ) − npM(1 − δ)/δ,
where the last inequality follows because M ≥ 1, by deﬁnition. The bounds on player 2’s payoﬀ fol-
low from inequalities (2) and (3), and from the fact that the payoﬀ proﬁle (U1(σ,δ|ht+1),U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht+1))
is an element of the set F. ￿
Deﬁnition A.2 (Stopping time). For any integer k, E[0,k] denotes the event (set of inﬁnite public
histories) where player 1 deviates from σ1(S) for the ﬁrst time in period t for some 0 ≤ t ≤ k. For
any strategy proﬁle σ = ({σ1(ω)}ω∈Ω,σ2), any measure   ∈ ∆, and any z′ ∈ (0,1], let







; and let T(σ, ,q) = ∞ if the set is empty.
Suppose that player 1’s initial reputation level  (S) = z and  (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ; pick z′ > 0 and
pick a strategy proﬁle σ∗ = ({σ1(ω)}ω∈Ω,σ∗
2). Let T = T(σ∗, ,z′). Further suppose that σ∗
2 is a
pure strategy. Because both σ1(S) and σ∗
2 are pure strategies, there is a unique path of play that
is induced by σ1(S) and σ∗
2. Suppose that T < ∞ and let hT and hT+1 denote the unique public
histories of terminal nodes consistent with (σ1(S),σ∗
2). If z < z′, then the stopping time deﬁnition
and Bayes’ rule implies that that  (S|hT) < z′ and  (S|hT+1) ≥ z′. Therefore there exists a unique
public history (hT,d∗) consistent with (σ1(S),σ∗
2) such that  (S|hT,d∗) < z′ and  (S|h′) ≥ z′ where
h′ = (hT,d′) is the public history that is reached immediately after d∗ if σ1(S) is used at node d∗
in period T. Also, by Bayes’ rule, the total probability that player 1 deviates from the Stackelberg
strategy at any decision node (in periods zero through T) up to but excluding (hT,d∗) is at most
1 − z/z′.
Lemma A.3. Posit perfect information and Assumption 1. For any   ∈ ∆ such that  (S) = z > 0
and  (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ, pick a PBE σ of Γ∞( ,δ) such that r(δ,σ2) ≥ R( ,δ) − ξ.40 For the chosen
40For each ξ > 0, such a PBE of Γ
∞( ,δ) exists because the resistance function R is deﬁned as the supremum over
the set {r(δ,σ2) : σ2 is part of a PBE of Γ
∞( ,δ)}.REPUTATION 35
PBE σ and any z′ > 0,
U2(σ,δ) ≤ ρ(q(z,z′) ¯ R(z,δ) + ¯ R(z′,δ) + 2npMǫ) + 5Mǫ − (R( ,δ) − ξ)zl, (13)
where ǫ = max{φ,1 − δ} and q(z,z′) = max{1 − z/z′,0}.
Proof. Choose a pure strategy σ∗
2 in the support of the possibly mixed strategy σ2 such that
r(σ∗
2,δ) ≥ R( ,δ) − ξ. Such a pure strategy exists because the mixed strategy σ2 has resistance
of at least R( ,δ) − ξ. Let proﬁle σ∗ = ({σ1(ω)}ω∈Ω,σ∗
2) and let T = T(σ∗, ,z′). If z < z′ and
T < ∞, then let (hT,d∗) denote the unique public history consistent with (σ1(S),σ∗
2) such that
 (S|(hT,d∗)) < z′ and  (S|h′) ≥ z′ where h′ = (hT,d′) is the public history that is reached imme-
diately after (hT,d∗) if σ1(S) is used at node d∗. If z′ ≤ z, then T = 0 and we let d∗ denote the
initial node of the game. If T = ∞, then we say d∗ = ∞ which means that there are no decision
nodes that come after d∗.
Given that  (S) = z and  (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ, if h = (ht,d′′) is a public history that is consistent
with (σ1(S),σ∗
2), then  (Ω−|h)/ (S|h) ≤ φ and  (S|h) ≥ z; and moreover if the decision node
(ht,d′′) comes after d∗, then  (S|h) ≥ z′.
Let E1 denote the event, i.e., set of inﬁnite histories, where player 1 deviates from σ1(S) in a
decision node before (and excluding) the decision node d∗ of period T. Also, let E2 denote the event
where player 1 deviates from σ1(S) in a decision node after (and including) the decision node d∗ of
period T.41 We will bound player 2’s payoﬀ from σ∗ in the following ﬁve events: ω = N and E1;
ω = N and E2; ω = N and player 1 never deviates from σ1(S); ω = S; and ω ∈ Ω−.
Before proceeding to bound player 2’s payoﬀ in the ﬁve events, as a preliminary step, we argue
that player 2’s payoﬀ until the period t where player 1 deviates from σ1(S) for the ﬁrst time is at
most (1 − δ)M ≤ ǫM. To see why, consider the following three possibilities: First, if player 2 plays
ab
2 in each period until time t, then her payoﬀ is zero. Second, if player 2 deviates from ab
2 in period
t′ ≤ t−np, then she receives at most (1−δ)M in period t′ and a punishment phase ensues. Lemma
A.1 implies that player 2’s discounted payoﬀ, for periods t′ through t′ + np − 1, is negative. Third,
if player 2 deviates from ab
2 in period t′ < t but t′ > t − np, then she receives at most (1 − δ)M
in period t′, a punishment phase ensues (but is not completed before period t), and she receives
at most zero in periods t′ + 1 through t − 1, i.e., she receives at most zero in each period of the
incomplete punishment phase.
41Observe that if d
∗ is the initial node, then E1 = ∅. Also, if d
∗ = ∞, then E2 = ∅.REPUTATION 36
We now bound player 2’s payoﬀ in the event ω = N and E1. Suppose that h∞ ∈ E1, then let
h = (hj,d) denote the node in period j in which player 1 deviates from σ1(S) for the ﬁrst time
in the inﬁnite public history h∞. Player 2’s payoﬀ until period j is at most ǫM and player 2’s
payoﬀ in period j is at most ǫM. Lemma A.2 and the fact that ǫ ≥ (1 − δ) together imply that
U2(σ1(N),σ∗
2,δ|hj+1) ≤ ρ( ¯ R(z,δ) + ǫMnp/δ). Hence, for any such period j, player 2’s repeated
game payoﬀ is at most
Mǫ + δjMǫ + δj+1ρ( ¯ R(z,δ) + ǫMnp/δ) ≤ 2Mǫ + ρ( ¯ R(z,δ) + npMǫ).
We therefore obtain:
(14) U2(σ1(N),σ∗
2,δ|E1) ≤ 2Mǫ + ρ( ¯ R(z,δ) + npMǫ).
We bound player 2’s payoﬀ in the event ω = N and E2. Suppose that h∞ ∈ E2, then let h = (hj,d)
denote the node at which player 1 deviates from σ1(S) for the ﬁrst time in the inﬁnite public history
h∞. Player 1’s reputation is at least z′ if he plays according to σ1(S) at the decision node d of
period j. Consequently, Lemma A.2 implies that U2(σ1(S),σ∗
2,δ|hj+1) ≤ ρ( ¯ R(z′,δ) + npMǫ/δ). As
a result, an argument identical to that in the previous paragraph implies that
(15) U2(σ1(N),σ∗
2,δ|E2) ≤ 2Mǫ + ρ( ¯ R(z′,δ) + npMǫ).
Player 2’s payoﬀ in the event that ω = S (i.e., the event in which she faces type S) is at most
−(R( ,δ)−ξ)l, and the probability of this event is equal to z. This is because player 2’s resistance
is at least R( ,δ) − ξ for the strategy σ∗
2; hence, she loses at least (R( ,δ) − ξ)l against S, by
Lemma A.1. Player 2’s payoﬀ in the event that ω ∈ Ω− (i.e., the event in which she faces any other
commitment type) is at most M, and the probability of this event is at most φz ≤ φ ≤ ǫ. A bound
on player 2’s payoﬀ in the event that ω = N and E1 is given by inequality (14), and the probability
of this event is at most q(z,z′). A bound on player 2’s payoﬀ in the event that ω = N and E2 is
given by inequality (15), and the probability of this event is at most one. Player 2’s payoﬀ in the
event that ω = N and player 1 never deviates from σ1(S) is at most zero. Consequently,
U2(σ∗,δ) ≤ q(z,z′)ρ ¯ R(z,δ) + ρ ¯ R(z′,δ) − z(R( ,δ) − ξ)l + 2ρnpMǫ + 5Mǫ.REPUTATION 37
Since σ∗
2 is in the support of PBE strategy σ2, we have U2(σ,δ) = U2(σ∗,δ). Hence,
U2(σ,δ) ≤ q(z,z′)ρ ¯ R(z,δ) + ρ ¯ R(z′,δ) − z(R( ,δ) − ξ)l + 2ρnpMǫ + 5Mǫ.
￿
Lemma A.4. Posit perfect information and Assumption 1 (i). Suppose that  (S) = z > 0 and
 (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ. In any PBE σ of Γ∞( ,δ) and for any z′ > 0, we have
(16) U2(σ,δ) ≥ −ρ(q(z,z′) ¯ R(z,δ) + ¯ R(z′,δ) + 2npMǫ) − 3Mǫ,
where ǫ = max{φ,1 − δ} and q(z,z′) = max{1 − z/z′,0}.
Proof. Fix a PBE proﬁle σ of Γ∞( ,δ). Let σ∗
2 denote a pure strategy which moves according to
ab
2 after any public history h that is consistent with σ1(S); and coincides with a pure strategy in
the support of the PBE strategy σ2 if public history h is not consistent with σ1(S). Let proﬁle
σ∗ = ({σ1(ω)}ω∈Ω,σ∗
2) and let T = T(σ∗, ,z′). If z < z′ and T < ∞, then let (hT,d∗) denote
the unique public history consistent with (σ1(S),σ∗
2) such that  (S|(hT,d∗)) < z′ and  (S|h′) ≥ z′
where h′ = (hT,d′) is the public history that is reached immediately after (hT,d∗) if σ1(S) is used
at node d∗. If z′ ≤ z, then T = 0 and we let d∗ denote the initial node of the game. If T = ∞, then
we say d∗ = ∞ which means that there are no decision nodes that come after d∗.
Because (as
1,ab
2) is played in each period under (σ1(S),σ∗
2), player 2 receives zero in each period
until player 1 deviates from σ1(S). Also, player 2’s payoﬀ in the period in which player 1 deviates
from σ1(S) is at least −Mǫ. Using the reasoning in Lemma A.3 and applying Lemma A.2 we obtain
U2(σ1(N),σ∗
2,δ|E1) ≥ −ρ( ¯ R(z,δ) + npMǫ) − Mǫ,
and
U2(σ1(N),σ∗
2,δ|E2) ≥ −ρ( ¯ R(z′,δ) + npMǫ) − Mǫ,
where E1 and E2 are the events deﬁned in Lemma A.3.
If player 1 never deviates from σ1(S), then player 2 receives zero. Player 2 can get at least −M
against any other commitment type, whom she faces with probability of at most φ ≤ ǫ; she gets
zero against type S, whom she faces with probability z. Following the same reasoning as in LemmaREPUTATION 38
A.3 and because σ2 is part of the PBE σ, we obtain
U2(σ,δ) ≥ U2(σ∗,δ) ≥ −ρq(z,z′) ¯ R(z,δ) − ρ ¯ R(z′,δ) − 2ρnpMǫ − 3Mǫ.
￿
Completing the proof of Theorem 1 by using Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.4. If Γ satisﬁes Assumption
1 and perfect information, then inequality (13) is satisﬁed, by Lemma A.3. If Γ satisﬁes Assumption
1 (i) and perfect information, then inequality (16) is satisﬁed, by Lemma A.4. Also, if Γ satisﬁes
Assumption 1 (ii), then U2(σ,δ) ≥ ˆ g2 = 0, and inequality (16) is trivially satisﬁed because the right-
hand side of the inequality is negative. By combining the upper and lower bounds for U2(σ,δ), given
by inequalities (13) and (16), and using the fact that ξ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily, we obtain
(17) zlR( ,δ) ≤ 2ρ(q(z,z′) ¯ R(z,δ) + ¯ R(z′,δ) + 2npMǫ) + 8Mǫ,
for any   ∈ ∆ such that  (S) = z and  (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ, and for any z′ ∈ (0,1]. Pick another
measure  ′ ∈ ∆ such that  ′(S) ≥ z and  ′(Ω−)/ ′(S) ≤ φ. By rewriting inequality (17) for  ′ and
z′ ∈ (0,1] and by rearranging, we obtain the following inequality:
(18) R( ′,δ) ≤
￿
2ρ(q( ′(S),z′) ¯ R( ′(S),δ) + ¯ R(z′,δ) + 2npMǫ) + 8Mǫ
￿
/ ′(S)l.
However, q(z,z′) ≥ q( ′(S),z′), because  ′(S) ≥ z; and ¯ R(z,δ) ≥ ¯ R( ′(S),δ) ≥ 0, because ¯ R is
nonnegative and nonincreasing in z. Substituting z for  ′(S), q(z,z′) for q( ′(S),z′), and ¯ R(z,δ)
for ¯ R( ′(S),δ) on the right-hand side of inequality (18) delivers the following:
(19) zlR( ′,δ) ≤ 2ρ(q(z,z′) ¯ R(z,δ) + ¯ R(z′,δ) + 2npMǫ) + 8Mǫ,
for all  ′ ∈ ∆ such that  ′(S) ≥ z and  ′(Ω−)/ ′(S) ≤ φ. Because ¯ R(z,δ) is the supremum over
the set {R( ′,δ) :   ∈ ∆, ′(S) ≥ z and  ′(Ω−)/ ′(S) ≤ φ}, and because each R( ′,δ) in this set
satisﬁes inequality (19), we obtain the following:
(20) zl ¯ R(z,δ) ≤ 2ρ(q(z,z′) ¯ R(z,δ) + ¯ R(z′,δ) + 2npMǫ) + 8Mǫ.
For any z ≥ z, substituting z for z in inequality (20) and rearranging gives the following functional
inequality:
(21) ¯ R(z,δ)(zl − 2ρq(z,z′)) ≤ 2ρ ¯ R(z′,δ) + 4M(ρnp + 2)ǫ.REPUTATION 39
Let q = zl/4ρ. If z,z′ ∈ [z,1] and z ∈ [z′(1 − q),z′], then q(z,z′) ≤ q. Hence, substituting q for
q(z,z′) in inequality (21) we obtain the following:
¯ R(z,δ)(zl − 2ρq) ≤ 2ρ ¯ R(z′,δ) + 4M(ρnp + 2)ǫ.















2) in the previous inequality, we obtain the following:
(22) ¯ R(z,δ) ≤ K ¯ R(z′,δ) + Kǫ.
However, the functional inequality (22) is identical to inequality (7) (since K and ǫ in inequality
(22) serve the same roles as C and 1 − δ in inequality (7)). Also, ¯ R(1,δ) = 0. Consequently, an
argument identical to the one used to establish Corollary 1 implies that ¯ R(z,δ) ≤
P¯ n−1
j=1 Kjǫ, where
¯ n is the smallest integer j such that (1−q)j−1 < z. Because K ≥ 2 we have ¯ R(z,δ) ≤
P¯ n−1
j=1 Kjǫ ≤
K¯ nǫ = K¯ n max{1 − δ,φ}. For any   such that  (S) ≥ z and  (Ω−)/ (S) ≤ φ, and for any
PBE strategy σ of Γ∞( ,δ), we have U1(σ,δ) ≥ 1 − R( ,δ) and R( ,δ) ≤ ¯ R(z,δ). Consequently,
U1(σ,δ) ≥ 1 − K¯ n max{1 − δ,φ}. ￿
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